Inside the Unlikely Electoral Pact Between Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Mohammed Dahlan

Inside the Unlikely Electoral Pact Between Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Mohammed Dahlan

An electoral alliance linking Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Mohammed Dahlan—the exiled former Fatah security chief who spent the late 2000s arresting and fighting both Islamist groups in Gaza—is no longer a rumor whispered in Cairo hotel lobbies. Driven by mutual political survival, intense regional pressure, and the catastrophic collapse of governance across the Palestinian territories, these bitter rivals have found narrow common ground. Their objective is straightforward: bypass the aging, deeply unpopular leadership of Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and secure a dominant foothold in whatever political framework emerges from the rubble of Gaza and the fractured West Bank.

To casual observers of Middle Eastern politics, this alignment looks like a hallucination. For nearly two decades, the ideological and physical fault line between Dahlan’s secular, Western-backed security apparatus and the Islamist armed resistance of Hamas and PIJ defined Palestinian internal conflict. Men died over this divide. Yet in the brutal arithmetic of Palestinian factionalism, ideology rarely survives an existential threat. When the survival of your movement depends on breaking a diplomatic and financial chokehold, yesterday’s executioner becomes today’s indispensable broker.

The Anatomy of a Marriage of Convenience

Understanding why this pact exists requires stripping away the public rhetoric of unity and looking at the cold balance sheet of power. Each faction brings something the others desperately lack, and each faces a specific crisis that it cannot solve alone.

For Hamas, the core problem is legitimacy and reconstruction. While the group retains deep networks across Palestinian society, its capacity to govern Gaza openly as a recognized international entity has been shattered by devastating military conflict and diplomatic isolation. Western donors and Gulf states will not write blank checks for reconstruction to a Hamas-run ministry. Hamas needs a clean political front—an acceptable intermediary capable of talking to Arab capitals, Washington, and European foreign ministries without triggering immediate sanctions.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad operates under an entirely different set of constraints. Historically, PIJ has boycotted Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, arguing that participation in institutions born out of the 1993 Oslo Accords legitimizes the occupation. However, pure rejectionism carries a heavy price when the political board is being completely reset. By aligning indirectly or coordinating electoral strategies with a broader front, PIJ avoids total marginalization while keeping its hands clean of day-to-day municipal governance.

Then there is Mohammed Dahlan. Expelled from Fatah by Mahmoud Abbas in 2011 and subsequently convicted in absentia by a Palestinian court on corruption charges he dismisses as politically motivated, Dahlan has spent over a decade building a parallel power base from his exile in the United Arab Emirates. He commands immense financial resources, deep ties to Abu Dhabi and Cairo, and a loyal network of cadres inside Gaza’s refugee camps, particularly in Khan Younis. What Dahlan lacks is street-level legitimacy inside the West Bank and a mechanism to overcome the stigma of being viewed by many Palestinians as an instrument of foreign intelligence services. Partnering with Islamist factions gives him instant nationalist cover.

What Each Faction Brings to the Table

  • Hamas provides the disciplined grassroots mobilization, ideological base, and proven electoral machinery that swept the 2006 legislative elections.
  • Mohammed Dahlan supplies access to Gulf capital, diplomatic backchannels in Cairo and Abu Dhabi, and a non-Islamist political veneer acceptable to international donors.
  • Islamic Jihad offers veto power over security spoilers and guarantees that a unified front will not face immediate armed sabotage from hardline rejectionists.

The Ghost of 2007 and Why It No Longer Matters

Anyone who covered Gaza in June 2007 remembers the sheer ferocity of the civil war between Hamas and Fatah. At the center of that storm was Mohammed Dahlan’s Preventive Security Force. Backed by American funding and Israeli security coordination, Dahlan’s men fought pitched street battles against Hamas’s Executive Force. When Hamas routed Fatah and seized total control of the Gaza Strip, Dahlan became the ultimate villain in Hamas’s official narrative—a symbol of collaboration and treason.

That animosity did not fade overnight. It took years of quiet, transactional diplomacy, brokered largely by Egyptian intelligence, to thaw the freeze.

The turning point arrived around 2017, when Gaza’s humanitarian and economic crisis reached a breaking point. Mahmoud Abbas, attempting to squeeze Hamas into surrendering control of the territory, slashed salaries for PA employees in Gaza and cut payments for the Strip’s electricity supply. Cornered, Hamas’s leadership in Gaza—then headed by Yahya Sinwar, who grew up in the same Khan Younis refugee camp as Dahlan—opened direct backchannel talks with his old adversary in Cairo.

The logic was simple. Abbas was starving Gaza; Dahlan, backed by Emirati money, was willing to fund social programs, electricity projects, and reconciliation payouts for families of fighters killed during the 2007 clashes. When money flows into a besieged enclave, old blood feuds get renegotiated. Over the next several years, Dahlan’s Democratic Reform Current quietly resumed operations inside Gaza under Hamas’s watchful eye. The unthinkable had already been normalized at the operational level long before anyone whispered about joint electoral slates.

Why Mahmoud Abbas Is the Real Target

You cannot understand this alliance without understanding the paralysis in Ramallah. For nearly twenty years, Mahmoud Abbas has ruled by decree, systematically dismantling the institutional checks of the Palestinian Authority while refusing to name a successor. The Palestinian Legislative Council has been defunct since 2007. Presidential elections haven't been held since 2005.

When Abbas unexpectedly called for legislative and presidential elections in early 2021—only to indefinitely postpone them months later when it became clear Fatah would fracture into competing lists—he exposed the fragility of his regime. During that brief pre-election window, the contours of an anti-Abbas front first became visible. Poll numbers showed that a fragmented Fatah, split between Abbas loyalists, Dahlan’s Democratic Reform Current, and the supporters of imprisoned leader Marwan Barghouti, would lose decisively to a unified Hamas slate.

Since then, the decay of the PA’s authority in the West Bank has accelerated dramatically. In cities like Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm, PA security forces have largely lost control of the refugee camps to younger, decentralized armed groups operating outside traditional factional command structures. Popular resentment toward Ramallah—driven by economic stagnation, allegations of corruption, and ongoing security coordination with Israel—is at an all-time high.

By coordinating their political moves, Hamas, PIJ, and Dahlan are executing a pincer movement against Abbas’s inner circle. They are betting that whether the next phase of Palestinian politics takes the form of formal elections, a reconstituted Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), or an interim technocratic administration, Abbas’s faction will be too weak and isolated to dictate the terms.

The Regional Chessboard Cairo and Abu Dhabi

No Palestinian political alliance survives without regional sponsors, and this one bears the unmistakable fingerprints of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

Cairo views the Gaza Strip primarily through the prism of national security. Having a chaotic, ungoverned vacuum on its Sinai border is Egypt’s worst-case scenario. Egyptian intelligence (the Mukhabarat) has spent decades managing Hamas, alternating between pressure and mediation. Yet Cairo knows that Hamas cannot govern Gaza alone in the post-war environment, nor can the current Ramallah leadership simply be parachuted back into the Strip on the back of foreign tanks. Egypt needs a hybrid formula—one that tames Hamas by integrating it into a broader political framework while inserting a pragmatic, Cairo-friendly figure like Dahlan to manage security and reconstruction funds.

Abu Dhabi’s calculus is equally strategic. The UAE has invested heavily in Dahlan for over a decade, using him as a key advisor and diplomatic fixer across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. For Emirati leaders, funding Gaza’s reconstruction is non-negotiable without fundamental structural reform of the Palestinian Authority. They view Abbas as an obstacle to regional stability and modernization. Backing an arrangement where Dahlan acts as the indispensable bridge between Gulf capital, international stakeholders, and Palestinian factions allows Abu Dhabi to project decisive influence over the future of Gaza and the broader Palestinian question.

The American and Israeli Dilemma

This emerging alignment creates an acute strategic headache for both Washington and Jerusalem.

For years, US policy rested on the assumption that a "revitalized" Palestinian Authority—essentially the existing Ramallah apparatus with a few cosmetic personnel changes—could eventually assume control over Gaza. That assumption ignored political reality on the ground. A PA leadership devoid of popular legitimacy cannot govern a traumatized population without massive, indefinite foreign military backing.

At the same time, Washington remains legally and politically barred from engaging directly with Hamas or PIJ, both of which are designated terrorist organizations. An electoral alliance or unified political front that blends Islamist factions with Dahlan’s secular network deliberately blurs those red lines. If Hamas and PIJ agree to sit behind a technocratic or Dahlan-led administrative front—retaining influence over local institutions without holding formal cabinet portfolios—Western policymakers will face an agonizing choice. They can either engage with the hybrid entity to facilitate humanitarian aid and reconstruction, or boycott it and watch the territory slide back into total collapse.

Israel faces an even starker contradiction. Successive Israeli governments operated under the doctrine of keeping Gaza and the West Bank politically divided to prevent the emergence of a unified Palestinian negotiating partner. Yet the complete destruction of civil order in Gaza has left Israel with no viable local counterparty to manage basic municipal services, border crossings, or aid distribution. While Israeli officials publicly reject any role for Hamas in post-war governance, elements within the Israeli security establishment have long maintained pragmatic channels with both Dahlan and regional intermediaries in Cairo. Whether Jerusalem would tolerate an indirect Hamas-Dahlan arrangement depends entirely on whether such a pact can enforce a durable ceasefire.

Structural Cracks That Could Tear the Pact Apart

Despite the compelling logic driving them together, an alliance between revolutionary Islamists and a secular strongman backed by Gulf monarchies is inherently unstable. The history of Middle Eastern politics is littered with tactical fronts that collapsed the moment they achieved their immediate goal of toppling a common rival.

The most obvious fault line is disarmament and security control. Dahlan’s entire pitch to Western capitals, Israel, and Gulf donors rests on his ability to restore law and order, centralize weapons, and prevent Gaza from being used as a launchpad for regional escalation. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, conversely, view their armed wings as the core of their identity and their primary leverage. Neither group will willingly surrender its weapons to a security force commanded by Dahlan’s loyalists. Any attempt to force the issue would instantly reignite the street battles of 2007.

Second, there is the problem of deep-seated grassroots distrust. Leadership deals struck in five-star hotels in Cairo or Doha do not automatically translate to obedience in the alleys of Jabalia or the neighborhoods of Hebron. For tens of thousands of Hamas rank-and-file members, Dahlan remains the man who tortured their brothers in Gaza prisons during the 1990s and 2000s. Similarly, many secular Fatah supporters view an alliance with Islamists as a betrayal of the movement’s founding principles. Convincing skeptical voters to back a joint list—or even a coordinated tactical slate—requires overcoming decades of visceral hatred.

Third, Iran’s reaction remains a massive wildcard. Tehran is the primary financial and military patron of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and a critical backer of Hamas’s military wing. Iran views the United Arab Emirates and any Western-aligned Palestinian security figure with deep suspicion. If Tehran concludes that this electoral pact is designed to pull Hamas and PIJ out of the "Axis of Resistance" and fold them into an Emirati-Egyptian sphere of influence, Iranian intelligence will aggressively use its financial leverage to fracture the alliance from within.

What Happens When the Ballots Are Counted

If this unlikely coalition actually makes it to a ballot box—or successfully shapes the composition of a transitional Palestinian leadership—the immediate consequence will be the definitive end of the post-Oslo political order.

For thirty years, Palestinian politics was structured around a binary choice: the secular nationalism of Fatah, which promised statehood through diplomacy, versus the armed resistance of Hamas and PIJ, which rejected compromise. Both models have visibly failed to deliver sovereignty, freedom, or basic economic security to ordinary Palestinians.

An alliance that fuses Hamas’s organizational depth, Islamic Jihad’s nationalist credentials, and Dahlan’s regional financial reach represents a third, purely transactional model of governance. It abandons grand ideological promises in favor of immediate survival, reconstruction money, and institutional power. It is messy, cynical, and deeply compromised by foreign agendas.

Yet in a landscape where every traditional institution is crumbling and millions of people are desperate for basic stability, political purity is a luxury nobody can afford. The factions driving this pact understand a fundamental truth that Western diplomats still struggle to grasp: you do not have to trust your partner to realize you are both trapped in the same burning building, and there is only one exit.

AM

Alexander Murphy

Alexander Murphy combines academic expertise with journalistic flair, crafting stories that resonate with both experts and general readers alike.